Attaining Justice through ‘Just and Equitable Compensation': A critique of South African courts' current approach to section 25(3) of The Constitution, and determining whether ‘Expropriation without Compensation' may be considered ‘Just and Equitable' by Arend, Ayesha
Attaining Justice through ‘Just and Equitable Compensation’: 
A critique of South African courts’ current approach to section 25(3) of The 
Constitution, and determining whether ‘Expropriation without Compensation’ 




for the degree of 
Master of Laws 
specialising in Constitutional and Administrative Law 
University of Cape Town 
Department of Public Law 
Under the supervision of 
Professor Pierre de Vos 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfilment of part of the requirements for 
the LLM in Constitutional and Administrative Law in approved courses and a minor dissertation. 
The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the completion of a programme of courses. 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the submission of the LLM 
in Constitutional and Administrative Law dissertations, including those relating to length and 
plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this dissertation conforms to those 
regulations. 
Student number: ARNAYE003 



















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 













1. I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another’s work and pretend that
its one’s own work.
2. I have used the South African Law Journal House Style convention for citation and
referencing. Each contribution to and quotation in this minor dissertation from the work
of other people, has been attributed and has been cited and referenced.
3. This minor dissertation is my own work.
4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of
passing it off as his or her own work.
Signature: 




Praise be to Allah, the most Gracious and most Merciful. I thank The Almighty for granting me 
the strength and courage I needed to pursue my legal career.  
To my parents. Thank you for your endless love, encouragement, sacrifices and support. You 
have given me something that no one else could have; the opportunity to follow my passion 
through social upliftment and to do good in this world.  
To my brother. Thank you for always reminding me that amidst all the hard work, laughter is 
the best medicine. May you continue to enjoy life to the fullest and inspire everyone around 
you, especially me.  
To my late grandparents who were dispossessed of their land, forcibly removed from their 
beloved homes, and deprived of the chance to reclaim what was rightfully theirs; I pray that 
you have found a land that has brought you peace and sustenance. 
Finally, to my supervisor, Professor Pierre de Vos. Thank you for your continuous assistance, 
guidance and positivity throughout my academic journey. Your benevolence and wisdom never 




















The land debate regarding just and equitable compensation and the potential ‘expropriation 
without compensation’ amendment to section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa1 has been a contentious issue in South Africa over the past year. Owing to colonialism 
and the apartheid regime, secured land rights and control were reserved for the white minority. 
This resulted in the mass dispossession of land that was owned and/or controlled by black, 
coloured and Asian people. In light of our country’s deplorable history of land dispossession, 
section 25(1) of the Constitution was included to command that no person be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application. In addition, in accordance with section 
25(2), property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application for a public 
purpose and subject to compensation. However, despite the inclusion of these transformative 
provisions, 25 years into our constitutional democracy, a large portion of previously 
disadvantaged individuals remain disadvantaged owing to socio-economic oppression, their 
inability to secure land rights and the country’s slow-moving land reform process. This 
dissertation is based on the notion that transformation in the area of land reform has been 
conducted at a glacial pace, owing to South African courts’ market value-centred approach to 
determining just and equitable compensation amounts that are to be awarded in expropriation 
cases. By analysing sections 25(2), 25(3) and 25(8) of the Constitution, the courts’ 
constitutional jurisprudence and academic literature, this dissertation aims to investigate 
whether it is necessary for the courts to re-evaluate the approaches taken during the initial stages 
of land reform; considering the need for a speedier land reform process. Upon considering the 
current composition of section 25(3), I contend that if the courts alter their approach to legal 
interpretation by placing more weight on a purposive approach when interpreting this section’s 
requirement of ‘just and equitable compensation’, the results of expropriation cases will give 
effect to the transformative values that underpin section 25 – hence the Constitution need not 
be amended to allow for expropriation without compensation in order to give effect to land 
reform as envisioned in section 25(8). This increased purposive approach to interpretation will 
encourage the courts to adopt an inclusive interpretation of ‘just and equitable compensation’ 
which allows for the expropriation of land with compensation, without compensation and with 
partial compensation.  
 
 
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
1.1 Motivation for the study 
The land debate regarding just and equitable compensation and the potential 
‘expropriation without compensation’ amendment to section 25 of the Constitution has been a 
contentious issue in South Africa over the past year. In light of our country’s deplorable history 
of land dispossession, section 25(1) of the Constitution commands that no person be deprived 
of property except in terms of law of general application, and that no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property. Section 25(2) of the Constitution states that property may be 
expropriated only in terms of law of general application – (a) for a public purpose or in the 
public interest; and (b) subject to the various factors listed in section 25 which includes 
compensation [the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either 
been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court]. However, on 25 July 2019, 
the National Assembly established an Ad Hoc committee which has been tasked with initiating 
and introducing legislation to amend section 25 of the Constitution to allow for expropriation 
without compensation.2 This decision to amend section 25 has given rise to the question of 
whether current landowners should be compensated when their land is targeted for land reform 
purposes and consequently, what would constitute just and equitable compensation.3 
 
Considering our nation’s history of colonialism and apartheid, it is common for black, 
coloured and Asian people to not hold or have access to secure land rights.4 Colonialism, 
followed by apartheid, resulted in the forceful dispossession land. Despite the abolition of the 
oppressive regime having given rise to our current constitutional democracy, the previously 
disadvantaged black majority remain subject to the poor socio-economic conditions that existed 
under colonialism and apartheid. There is thus an urgent need to speed up the land redistribution 
process in South Africa, as having access to secure land rights is an important step to improving 
the socio-economic status of indigent, previously disadvantaged people.  
 
 
2 J Gerber ‘Land expropriation: Ad Hoc committee to call land experts on amendment on Constitution’ News 24 
11 September 2019, available at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/land-expropriation-ad-hoc-
committee-to-call-land-experts-on-amendment-on-constitution-20190911, accessed on 04 October 2019. 
3 A Crosby ‘Compensation: What is fair and equitable in the context of land reform?’ (2017) Agri SA at 1. 
4 South African Human Rights Commission Submission to the Joint Constitutional Review Committee regarding 
Section 25 of the Constitution (2018) at 3. 
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There are at least three distinct positions on awarding compensation upon expropriation 
– no compensation; market value compensation plus losses; and just and equitable 
compensation. In addition, some argue for a mix of no compensation and just and equitable 
compensation. At present, the Constitution proposes that just and equitable compensation be 
awarded, and that such compensation should reflect a balance between the public interest and 
the interests of those affected by expropriation.5 However, there are differing views amongst 
the leading political parties regarding what the amendment should entail. The Economic 
Freedom Fighters (EFF) hold the position that all land should be state-owned whilst the African 
National Congress (ANC) argues for expropriation without compensation in some cases.6 The 
reasoning behind the argument for expropriation without compensation is that the land was 
stolen by the ancestors of white landowners and should thus be taken back without 
compensating the present landowners.7 However, the state’s reluctance to expropriate land 
against nil or nominal compensation, which can in turn be attributed to the courts being in 
favour of providing compensation at or above market value, has delayed our country’s land 
reform process. This dissertation is thus based on the notion that transformation in the area of 
land reform has been conducted at a slow-moving pace and that this delay is owing to the courts’ 
preference for using market-value as a starting point when determining the compensation 
amounts to be awarded in expropriation cases, and the manner in which existing land restitution 
and redistribution has been carried out. It is therefore necessary for the courts to embrace the 
concept of transformative constitutionalism in the property law sector, as this holds the potential 
to speed up the land reform process.8  
 
Section 25(3) of the Constitution states that the amount of the compensation and the 
time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, thus reflecting an equitable balance 
between the public interest and the interests of those affected. Furthermore, this section lists 
various factors to be considered in determining a just and equitable amount which include – the 
current use of the property; history of the acquisition and use of the property; market value of 
the property; extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial 
 
5 Section 25(3) of the Constitution. 
6 T Ngcukaitobi ‘The land wars of 2019: Analysing the EFF and ANC manifestos’ Mail & Guardian 7 February 
2019, available at https://mg.co.za/article/2019-02-07-00-the-land-wars-of-2019-analysing-the-eff-and-anc-
manifestos, accessed on 29 November 2019. 
7 Crosby op cit note 3. 
8 E Du Plessis Compensation for Expropriation under the Constitution (published LLD thesis, Stellenbosch 
University, 2009) at 4. 
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capital improvement of the property; and the purpose of the expropriation.9 Given the slow 
economic growth rate of the South African real estate sector,10 it is unsurprising that one of the 
main challenges which arise when determining a just and equitable amount is dealing with the 
notion that the market value of property should be prioritised above the other factors. This 
notion was reinforced in 2006 when the Constitutional Court of South Africa (CCSA) gave its 
interpretation of section 25(3) in the case of Du Toit v Minister of Transport,11 and found that 
market value should be used as a point of departure when determining the amount payable as 
compensation.12  
 
Considering the position in Du Toit was adopted during the first decade of our 
Constitution’s existence i.e. during a period wherein land reform suggestions and discussions 
were still well underway, it is necessary to re-evaluate the approaches taken during the initial 
stages of land reform, considering we are twenty-five years into our constitutional democracy 
and remain subject to a land reform process whereby little land redistribution has taken place. 
Such re-evaluation requires that the judiciary place increased emphasis on a purposive approach 
in their interpretation of section 25 and related property laws (especially when interpreting the 
weight that a factor such as market value should hold) in order to facilitate a speedier land 
redistribution process, provided that the state carry out its land reform commitments efficiently. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that formalities should fall to the wayside. A sound legal and 
judicial system necessitates the application of legal principles, whilst having due regard for the 
substantive context. The judiciary has at present, managed to strike a balance (for the most part) 
between upholding the values enshrined in the Constitution (through a purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation) and upholding the application of traditional legal principles (through 
an orthodox text-based/literal approach to statutory interpretation).13 However, there is a need 
to extend this mix of a purposive approach and literal approach to the interpretation of property 
law, with more emphasis being placed on considering the purpose behind property laws, as 
opposed to merely applying outdated traditional property laws (specifically to expropriation 
cases concerning the awarding of just and equitable compensation) in order to speed up the land 
 
9 The Constitution supra note 5. 
10 SA Commercial Prop News ‘Property Investors need to be Patient’ 24 July 2019, available at 
http://www.sacommercialpropnews.co.za/property-investment/9050-sa-property-investors-need-to-be-
patient.html, accessed on 04 October 2019. 
11 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC). 
12 Ibid para 37. 
13 T Roux ‘Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa’ (2008) 7 Int’l J. 
Constitutional Law 106 at 126. 
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reform process while simultaneously ensuring that the courts maintain institutional competence 
in our one-party dominant state.14 Furthermore, having due regard for the formal and 
substantive elements that underpin property law contributes towards achieving the mandate of 
transformative constitutionalism. 
 
1.2 Research question, hypothesis and aim of the study 
Upon critically evaluating the courts’ interpretation of ‘just and equitable 
compensation’ as per section 25(3) of the Constitution, I aim to answer the following research 
question: Have judges utilised an orthodox text-based (literal) approach or a purposive 
approach to legal interpretation in their reasoning when dealing with expropriation cases which 
concern the awarding of just and equitable compensation? Consequently, I aim to assess 
whether a literal approach or purposive approach to legal interpretation should be utilised to 
allow for the expropriation of land without compensation under section 25(3) of the 
Constitution (in its current composition), on the basis that land restitution and redistribution is 
necessary to speed up the land reform process. However, to do so, it is required that section 25 
be interpreted in a specific manner. Through considering the current composition of section 
25(3), I will argue that if the courts place more weight on a purposive approach when 
interpreting this section (and section 25 as a whole), the results of expropriation cases will give 
direct effect to the transformative values that underpin section 25(3). Hence, the Constitution 
need not be amended to allow for expropriation without compensation in order to facilitate and 
speed up the land reform process as envisioned in section 25(8).  
 
My argument can thus be construed as an alternative, in the event that Parliament 
decides against the proposed amendment of section 25 (which would allow for expropriation 
without compensation). Finally, I will consider whether expropriation against nil compensation 
and expropriation against nominal compensation constitute just and equitable compensation. 
After establishing that sections 25(2)-(3) read with section 25(8) provide the requisite 
justification to expropriate property in order to facilitate and speed up the land reform process, 
and that expropriation against nil or nominal compensation may constitute just and equitable 
compensation in some cases, I will argue in favour of adopting a flexible approach to awarding 





this flexible approach will ensure that both private and public interests are upheld through the 
state’s ability to award compensation at or above market value in cases where it is deemed fit; 
to award nil compensation in cases where it is deemed fit; and to award nominal/partial 
compensation in cases where compensation is required, but where it is deemed fit for the state 
to award a compensation amount that is significantly below market value (owing to national 
budgetary constraints). 
 
The basic assumption underlying this study is the notion that under our constitutional 
dispensation, the courts have employed a mix of a literal approach and a purposive approach to 
the interpretation of statutes in its judgments.15 This was established in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs16  whereby Ngcobo J stated that: 
 
‘The technique of paying attention to context in statutory construction is now required by the 
Constitution, in particular, s 39(2). As pointed out above, that provision introduces a mandatory 
requirement to construe every piece of legislation in a manner that promotes the “spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.”’17  
 
In addition, a purposive reading of a statute ‘must of course remain faithful to the actual 
wording of the statute’.18 However, despite the requirement that the courts employ a mix of both 
a literal and purposive approach to interpretation, the courts have maintained a preference for a 
literal, formalistic approach to interpretation (in being market value-centred) when adjudicating 
expropriation cases concerning just and equitable compensation. As a result, this has stunted 
the growth of expropriation-centred land reform. Despite the establishment of our constitutional 
democracy, the courts’ preference for a literal approach to interpretation has maintained a 
conservative, formalistic approach to property law that was prevalent in its pre-constitutional 
jurisprudence on expropriation. This is evident in the face cases of my dissertation i.e. Du Toit 
v Minister of Transport (CCSA), Msiza v Uys19 (LCC), Msiza v Director General for the 
 
15 Bertie van Zyl (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister for Safety and Security and Others 2010 (2) SA 181 (CC) 
paras 21-22.  
16 Bato Star Fishing Pty (Ltd) v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC). 
17 Ibid para 91. 
18 Bertie van Zyl supra note 15 para 22. 
19 Msiza and Others v Uys and Others (LCC39/01) [2004] ZALCC. 
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Department of Rural Development and Land Reform20 (LCC) and Uys NO v Msiza21 (SCA), 
whereby the courts, at various judicial levels, placed a larger emphasis on the literal meaning 
of the text under section 25(3) in holding that market value should be the starting point when 
determining a just and equitable compensation amount.  
 
The consequence of upholding the notion that market value should be the starting point 
in compensation amount determinations is that it tends to become the determining factor in 
compensation amount determinations. As a result, land is expropriated against seemingly just 
and equitable compensation amounts that are of high market value/above market value, thus 
burdening the already scarce availability of state resources. In addition, owing to corruption, it 
is common for compensation amounts that are above market value to be paid.22 This was 
confirmed by the High-Level Panel on Land Reform and Rural Development, led by former 
president Kgalema Motlanthe, which drafted a report and concluded that ‘corruption, nepotism 
and incompetence are to blame for failed land reform’.23 Following the release of this report, 
the Special Investigating Unit found that 148 land reform projects between 2011 and 2017 have 
been flagged for suspicious or fraudulent activity, thus confirming the report’s corruption 
related findings.  Consequently, having a considerable number of ‘above market value’ 
compensation related expropriation cases produces precedent that does not reflect an equitable 
balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected (i.e. private property 
ownership interests) and is thus not in favour of previously disadvantaged individuals. Hence, 
the large emphasis placed on a literal approach to interpreting section 25 in our constitutional 
democracy does not give effect to the section’s underlying transformative values.  
 
In light of South Africa’s socio-economic history with regards to land adjudication, I 
deduce that the courts, as agents of social transformation, should always add more weight when 
considering the purpose of land rights and in discussing the constitutional values underpinning 
section 25 in the legal reasoning of expropriation cases, so as to best understand the need to 
give effect to the rights of previously disadvantaged people and ultimately, further the land 
 
20Msiza v Director-General for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and Others 2016 (5) SA 
513 (LCC). 
21 Uys NO and Another v Msiza and Others 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA). 
22 T de Jager ‘It’s not the willing seller, but the corrupt buyer sabotaging land reform’ News 24 24 June 2019, 
available at https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/its-not-the-willing-seller-but-the-corrupt-buyer-




reform agenda. The reasons for this are owing to the undeniable link between black individuals’ 
right to property and their right to human dignity, and the need to eradicate the formalistic 
approach to interpretation that is prevalent in the courts’ post-apartheid property jurisprudence 
(which has been reinforced by neo-institutionalism). Considering the Du Toit case was decided 
during the early years of the CCSA’s establishment, it is necessary for a case concerning 
expropriation against just and equitable compensation to be tested in present years, as it is likely 
that the Court would depart from its market value-centred approach when determining 
compensation amounts, since the progressive socio-political climate that has developed over 
the years would likely have an influence on the Court’s reasoning in property law cases today. 
 
Considering there has been much debate around the courts’ determination of the section 
25(3) meaning of ‘just and equitable compensation’,24 my analysis is important as it will assess 
whether the courts have adequately determined the meaning of ‘just and equitable’ and whether 
it should continue to uphold market value as the determining factor in expropriation against 
compensation related cases. I will do this by critiquing the interpretative approaches taken in 
the relevant cases and then deducing that the courts should place larger emphasis on a purposive 
approach, so as to give effect to the transformative values underpinning the requirement of just 
and equitable compensation. Following my deduction that the courts’ preference for using 
market value as the starting point when determining compensation amounts constitutes an 
inadequate approach to interpreting the meaning of ‘just and equitable compensation’, I will 
explore what ‘expropriation without compensation’ could entail by considering whether it is 
constitutionally permissible to award nil or nominal compensation as ‘just and equitable 
compensation’ in expropriation cases which aim to further land reform, thus eradicating the 
need to amend section 25 of the Constitution. This will provide clarity on whether the CCSA 
needs to reconsider its determination of the meaning of ‘just and equitable compensation’. 
 
1.3 The history of land dispossession which gave rise to the current land rights 
dispensation in South Africa 
The fundamental reasoning behind the inclusion of the property clause was to extend 
property rights to the previously disadvantaged black majority who were deprived from owning 
 
24 M Bishop & T Ngcukaitobi The Constitutionality of Expropriation Without Compensation (2018). 
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property and obtaining various property rights in our pre-constitutional era. As noted in Port 
Elizabeth v Various Occupiers:25 
 
‘The blatant disregard manifested by racist statutes for property rights in the past makes it all the 
more important that property rights be fully respected in the new dispensation, both by the state 
and private persons. Yet such rights have to be understood in the context of the need for the 
orderly opening-up or restoration of secure property rights for those denied access to or deprived 
of them in the past.’26 
 
South Africa’s history of land dispossession includes black South Africans being 
subjected to the oppressive regimes of colonialism and apartheid. These regimes centred on 
racial segregation and as a result, black South Africans were forcefully removed by the state 
from land that they occupied/owned for many years.27 The colonial conquest and the apartheid 
regime which followed it effectively restructured the ownership and control of South African 
land and resources.28 The legislative measures enacted to govern this restructuring of ownership 
entrenched deep disparities between the minority white population who gained ownership of 
majority of the land, and the majority black population who were impoverished due to 
landlessness.29  
 
Owing to the colonial conquest, white settlers appropriated large portions of South 
African land for themselves, obtained supremacy of the land, and reserved the remaining land 
for indigenous African people (black South Africans who lived communally under the 
leadership of chiefs). However, despite obtaining supremacy of the land, settlers feared that the 
African chiefdoms who occupied all land prior to the settlers would later fight to regain their 
land. 30 Hence the settlers’ decision to undermine chiefdoms and their power. Settlers 
determined that chiefdoms could be undermined by removing the communal tenure of land. 
The settlers thus sought to exercise full control over black South Africans’ ability to hold land 
 
25 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
26 Ibid para 15. 
27 R T Ally ‘The Development of the System of Individual Tenure Special Reference for Africans, with Special 
Reference to the Glen Grey Act. C 1894 – 1922’ (1985) Rhodes University, Grahamstown 78. 
28 H Mostert ‘Land restitution, social justice and development in South Africa’ (2002) 119 SALJ at 403. 
29 Ibid at 401. 
30 M Weideman Land Reform, Equity and Growth in South Africa: A Comparative Analysis (unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2003) 10. 
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rights by introducing a Western model of individual tenure of land which was regulated through 
title deeds.31 Consequently, many chiefs and villagers resisted the new individualistic tenure 
system as it opposed their customary beliefs which embodied group tenure systems.32 However, 
this resistance proved to be unsuccessful, considering individual tenure increased in rural 
areas.33  
 
Individual tenure, together with a labour shortage during the 1890s, gave rise to the 
implementation of additional laws which aimed to breakdown communal tenure. Hence, the 
enactment of the Glen Grey Act,34 which aimed to replace communal tenure with individual 
tenure and implemented a labour tax in attempt to force Xhosa men into employment on 
commercial farms. However, despite its attempt to breakdown communal tenure, the Glen Grey 
Act was unsuccessful in practice, hence the enactment of the Natives Land Act35 which 
enforced racial segregation by means of regulating and restricting land acquisition, and 
ultimately ratifying the ongoing practice of land dispossession. 
 
The Natives Land Act was the first Act under the Union government of South Africa. 
This Act prevented white people from buying land from black South Africans and vice versa. 
Hence, it prevented white farmers from buying more land occupied by black South Africans. 
However, it also bound the movement of black South Africans to scheduled reserve areas and 
limited their ability to hold land rights.36 As a result, the land allocated to them as per the Act 
remained state-controlled entities. Hereafter, the Native Trust and Land Act37 was established 
to hold the land which was set aside for black South Africans. The Trust was tasked with 
purchasing land to be used for black settlements in each of the South African provinces.38 
Tenure could thereafter only be held by black South Africans through rights and land ownership 





34 Glen Grey Act of 1894. 
35 Natives Land Act 27 of 1913. 
36 Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives ‘Land issues: Blackspots, forced removals and resettlement’ 
available at http://paton.ukzn.ac.za/Collections/blackspotsandforcedremovals.aspx, accessed on 11 September 
2019. 





The main reasoning behind colonial land dispossession was to cause an imbalance in 
the power relations between black South Africans and colonial settlers.40 If black South 
Africans were banned from owning land, they could not reap the fruits of the land and utilise it 
for commercial purposes. These respective laws set the foundation for the impending apartheid 
state’s control of land which aimed to institutionalise racial and class segregation by developing 
a hierarchy of land ownership in terms of private law.41  
 
The problem of land dispossession worsened following the coming to power of the 
apartheid regime. The enactment of the Group Areas Act42 under this regime prohibited 
individuals from certain racial groups from using, occupying and owning land in areas that later 
became designated for the white population and was used as the main tool to redefine ‘black 
spots’43 (which were known to possess fertile land for cultivation) and to remove black South 
Africans from their land.44 Approximately 7,5 million people were dispossessed from their land 
between 1960 and 1983 under the pretence that this land would be used to ‘benefit the general 
public’.45 However, the purpose underpinning these laws was the removal of land as a resource 
from other racial groups so as to secure the most economically viable portions of land for the 
white minority. The result of the enactment of these laws was the development of a legal 
institution of property law which became an ‘effective vehicle’ used to ensure that the white 
minority were protected against infringements of their land rights.46  
 
Pending the fall of the apartheid regime, the negotiation period between liberation 
groups and the National Party sought to reform the old property regime so as to develop a 
constitutional order based on transformative constitutionalism. The negotiations concerning 
land reform aimed to establish a just property regime which aimed to reverse the effects of land 
 
40 G Muller ‘The Legal-Historical Context of Urban Forced Evictions in South Africa’ (2013) Unisa Press 381. 
41 AJ Van der Walt ‘Dancing with Codes – Protecting, Developing and Deconstructing Property Rights in the 
Constitutional State’ (2001) 118 SALJ at 261-263. 
42 Group Areas Act 36 of 1966. 
43 An area of land that was designated for the white population but occupied by black Africans. See J Van Wyk 
& M Oranje ‘The post-1994 South African spatial planning system and Bill of Rights: A meaningful and 
mutually beneficial fit?’ (2014) 13(4) Planning Theory at 349-369. 
44 S Rugege ‘Land Reform in South Africa: An Overview’ (2004) 32 International Journal of Legal Information 
at 285. 
45 Ibid. 
46 AN Basajjasubi Deconstructing section 25 of the Constitution: Has the inclusion of property rights in section 
25 of the Constitution helped or hindered the transformation purpose of the Constitution, and specifically, the 
state’s commitment to land reform? (published LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2017) at 10. 
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dispossession by facilitating land restitution and redistribution to ensure equitable access to 
land and to alleviate poverty.47 Following these negotiations, section 25 of the Final 
Constitution was drafted to state that: 
 
25 Property 
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law 
may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application- 
(a) For a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) Subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of 
which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and 
equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including- 
(a) The current use of the property; 
(b) The history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(c) The market value of the property; 
(d) The extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital 
improvement of the property; and 
(e) The purpose of the expropriation. 
(4) For the purposes of this section- 
(a) The public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to 
bring about equitable access to land on all South Africa’s natural resources: and 
(b) Property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either 
to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
 
47 Ibid at 11. 
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(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 19213 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either 
to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state form taking legislative and other 
measurers to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance 
with the provisions of section 36(1). 
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6). 
 
The eradication of the apartheid regime and the inclusion of section 25 in the Final 
Constitution instilled hope for socio-economic freedom amongst previously disadvantaged 
South Africans. However, despite being twenty-five years into our constitutional democracy, 
majority of the South Africans who were affected by land dispossession were not compensated 
for the loss of their land and continue to live in a cycle of poverty.48 Considering the spatial and 
socio-economic effects of our dismal past, it is imperative that South African courts extend its 
due regard for human dignity in related cases to expropriation cases concerning the awarding 
of just and equitable compensation. Having due regard for our nation’s historical context will 
encourage a shift in the courts’ approach to expropriation and related property laws from one 
that is literal and formalistic to one that is largely purposive. This will contribute towards 
achieving our country’s constitutional mandate which embodies transformative 
constitutionalism (to be illustrated in Chapter 3). 
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of section 25 in the Final Constitution was an important step 
in transforming our pre-constitutional legal system’s attitude towards securing land rights for 
previously disadvantaged South Africans and eradicating the deplorable socio-economic effects 
of the oppressive property laws that governed the lives of non-white people during the colonial 
and apartheid periods. Owing to the effects that our history of land dispossession has had on 
black South Africans, it is imperative for the courts to emphasise that section 25 must be 
interpreted in light of the historical context within which it was enacted under our constitutional 
dispensation. The reasoning behind the need to consider our country’s historical context when 
 
48 Rugege op cit note 44 at 286. 
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dealing with property related cases (especially expropriation cases) was aptly captured in 
Shoprite Checkers v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development:49 
 
‘The pre-constitutional conception of property … entailed exclusive individual entitlement. Put 
simply, that is largely a history of dispossession of what indigenous people held, and its transfer 
to the colonisers in the form of land and other property, protected by an economic system that 
ensured the continued deprivation of those benefits on racial and class lines. That history of 
division probably explains the concerns both the previously advantaged and disadvantaged still 
have. The former fears that they will lose what they have; the latter that they will not receive what 
is justly theirs.’50 
 
The Court’s acknowledgment of our history of land dispossession in this case illustrates 
its awareness of the urgent need for land reform and the need to interpret section 25 ‘with due 
regard to the gross inequality in relation to wealth and land distribution in this country’.51 In 
addition, it reinforces that section 25, under our constitutional democracy, should not only 
protect private property rights, but also protect the public aspect that comes with it. Having due 
regard for the social elements that underpin private property rights will contribute towards the 
state’s ability to meet its social obligations regarding land reform. Given that the consideration 
of our country’s historical context forms the basis of considering the purpose underpinning 
section 25 and related property laws, it is imperative that the courts adopt an increased 
purposive approach to interpreting these laws in order to give effect to the reform aims of 
section 25 and the Constitution as a whole. Consequently, utilising an increased purposive 
approach when interpreting ‘just and equitable compensation’ under section 25(3) such that it 
allows for expropriation against nil or nominal compensation, will encourage expropriation for 
land reform purposes and speed up the process of land redistribution that is needed to reverse 





49 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 34. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 61. 
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Chapter 2 – An overview of the purposes of sections 25 (2)-(3) and section 25(8) 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I will be focusing on sections 25(2), 25(3) and 
25(8), insofar as they are most relevant in my discussion relating to expropriating land against 
just and equitable compensation for the purposes of land reform. I will now provide a brief 
overview of what each section entails before discussing section 25’s underlying transformative 
commitment to achieving land reform (against just and equitable compensation in some cases) 
in Chapter 3. 
 
Section 25 of the Constitution comprises eight subsections, all of which are inter-related 
and should be considered both separately and together. Sections 25(1), (2) and (3) entrench the 
negative elements of property rights and can be considered the defensive subsections whereas 
sections 25(4) – (9) reflect the positive elements of these rights and can thus be considered the 
reformist subsections.52 Following the enactment of the Final Constitution, it was clear that the 
defensive subsections would act in favour of white previously advantaged property owners 
whereas the reformist subsections would act in favour of previously disadvantaged black 
individuals who were yet to become property owners, in order to level the playing fields by 
redressing and transforming ‘the legacy of a grossly unequal distribution of land in this 
country’.53 However, as time has passed, it has become apparent through case law that the 
defensive subsections are increasingly being used to serve all property owners; owing to the 
increase in black property owners. For the purposes of this dissertation, in order to achieve the 
underlying transformative goals of the reformist subsections [when considering section 25(8) 
in particular], it is necessary to first consider the relevant defensive subsections [sections 25(2)-
(3)] which allow for expropriation against compensation and how these subsections have been 
interpreted. Following this consideration, we are then able to develop the alternative, flexible 





52 J Dugard ‘Unpacking Section 25: Is South Africa’s property clause an obstacle or engine for socio-economic 
transformation?’ (2018) Constitutional Court Review – Wits University at 4. 
53 Haffejee NO and Others v Ethekwini Municipality and Others 2011 (6) SA 134 (CC) para 30. 
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2.1 Section 25(2) – Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general 
application 
Section 25(2) concerns the state’s expropriation of private property for public benefit. 
The state’s power to expropriate is set out in section 25(2), which establishes that property can 
be expropriated only in terms of law of general application –  
a) for a public purpose; and  
b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which 
have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.  
 
This section sets up the three requirements for an expropriation. First, it must be in terms 
of a law of general application, which includes legislation or regulations. Second, it must be for 
a public purpose or in the public interest. Considering this dissertation is limited to the 
constitutionality of expropriation against nil or nominal compensation for the purposes of land 
reform, I will not consider the constitutionality of expropriation for other purposes. Third, the 
compensation amount must either be determined by agreement or be decided or approved by a 
court. This final requirement plays a central role in allowing an attempt to expropriate land 
against nil or nominal compensation,54 and is essential in that it gives rise  to the constitutional 
right encapsulated in section 34 whereby ‘everyone has the right to have any dispute that can 
be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court’.  
 
The third requirement i.e. that the compensation amount be decided or approved by a 
court, means that the court can either play an original (deciding) role or a reviewing (approving) 
role in expropriation cases.55 However, with this discretion comes the more difficult question 
i.e. should the court be granted the unfettered right to approve the compensation amount or 
would it be acceptable to limit the court’s reviewing power such that it is only allowed to review 
whether the initial compensation determination was rational or reasonable.56 Owing to the 
urgent need to speed up the land redistribution process, I deduce that it is imperative for the 
courts to be granted the discretion to develop a flexible approach to determining compensation 
amounts. Such flexibility will grant the courts the discretion to decide whether expropriation 
 
54 Bishop and Ngcukaitobi op cit note 24 at 6. 




against compensation; against nil compensation or against nominal compensation is deemed fit 
on a case by case basis. However, in order to develop this flexible approach to determining 
compensation amounts, it is necessary for the courts to adopt an increased purposive approach 
to interpreting section 25 and related property laws, as this will encourage the courts to 
determine compensation amounts that take historical and substantive context into account and 
consequently give effect to expropriation for land reform purposes under section 25(8). This 
requirement for an increased purposive approach to interpretation will be illustrated in Chapter 
3. 
 
2.2 Section 25(3) – The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment 
must be ‘just and equitable’ 
Section 25(3) includes the factors that should be considered when determining a 
compensation amount. The awarding of just and equitable compensation is to be calculated in 
terms of section 25(3), which states that: 
 
The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, 
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, 
having regard to all relevant circumstances, including - 
(a)  the current use of the property; 
(b)  the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(c)  the market value of the property; 
(d)  the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial 
capital improvement of the property; and 
(e)  the purpose of the expropriation. 
 
The CCSA has emphasised that while section 25(3) should be used as a starting point 
when determining a compensation amount, it does not consider market value above the other 




‘Section 25(3) indeed does not give market value a central role. Viewed in the context of our 
social and political history, questions of expropriation and compensation are matters of acute 
socio-economic concern and could not have been left to be determined solely by market forces.’57  
 
Despite the superiority of this decision, in practice, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) 
in Uys NO v Msiza58 undermined the principle in Du Toit by adopting two methods that make 
market value the primary factor when determining a compensation amount i.e. the two-stage 
approach and the prohibition on double counting.59 Considering section 25(3) forms the basis 
of my dissertation, I will discuss the details of the requirement of just and equitable 
compensation, and the approach to interpretation that the courts have adopted when dealing 
with expropriation against just and equitable compensation for the purposes of land reform later 
on in this dissertation. 
 
2.2.1 Defining ‘just and equitable’ compensation 
 Section 25(3) provides for the determination of compensation in a just and equitable 
manner that reflects an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected by the expropriation.60 This requirement of a compensation determination and a 
balancing inquiry empowers the courts and consequently, the state, with flexibility to adopt a 
compensation formula that has due regard for the need to advance expropriation-centred land 
reform subject to budgetary constraints.61 Flexibility is required in order to balance the opposing 
rights when determining a compensation amount so as to give effect to land reform within the 
national budget and simultaneously protect private property rights where necessary.62 
Entrenching such flexibility will ensure that our historical context and founding values of the 
Constitution are taken into account when determining a compensation amount. 
 
 When determining a compensation amount, it is necessary to consider all the factors 
listed in section 25(3)(a)-(e). As established in Du Toit, the language of this section does not 
 
57 Du Toit supra note 11 para 36. 
58 Uys NO v Msiza supra note 21 paras 11-13. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Section 25(3) of the Constitution. 
61 J Zimmerman ‘Property on the line: Is an expropriation centred land reform constitutionally permissible?’ 
(2005) 122 SALJ 378 at 407. 
62 PE Municipality supra note 25 paras 19-23. 
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favour market value above the other factors. Rather, it implies that all relevant circumstances 
outlined in these factors be considered together in determining a just and equitable 
compensation amount that is against nil or nominal compensation in cases where land is 
expropriated for reform purposes. It can thus be argued that expropriation against nil or nominal 
compensation are constitutionally permissible where such compensation amounts are 
determined to be just and equitable, following a balance inquiry between the public interest and 
related private interests.63 Such an interpretation attempts to reconcile the state’s duty to 
promote land reform and its duty to pay just and equitable compensation when required,64 and 
gives effect to the need to place a larger emphasis on purposive interpretation when dealing 
with land reform cases (to be illustrated in Chapter 3). 
 
The Constitution’s position on expropriation and just and equitable compensation under 
section 25(3) differs from the state’s current expropriation-centred land reform in practice. This 
is evident when examining section 25(3) which lists market value as one of the factors to be 
considered in a compensation determination, against section 12 of the Expropriation Act65 
which prescribes the calculation of compensation in accordance with market value that is 
informed by the willing seller/willing buyer principle. This difference is exhibited through the 
way in which the Constitution envisions the state’s duty to take reasonable legislative measures 
to foster conditions that enable citizens to gain access to land as per section 25(5), versus the 
way in which the state actually perceives this duty.66  
 
The current reality of expropriation against compensation under our constitutional 
dispensation is that the pre-constitutional Expropriation Act’s approach to market value has 
influenced the courts’ approach to determining compensation amounts under section 25(3).67 
This approach was displayed in Du Toit whereby the CCSA first established the market value 
of the land, then determined how market value should fair against the other factors listed in 
section 25(3). This preference to expropriate land against market value and only thereafter 
determine whether it should be reduced in light of the other factors listed in section 25(3) has 
 
63 AJ Van der Walt ‘Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay an equitable compensation 
for expropriation’ (2006) 123 SALJ 23 at 38. 
64 Basajjasubi op cit note 46 at 51. 
65 Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
66 Basajjasubi op cit note 46 at 52. 
67 Van der Walt op cit note 63 at 39. 
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resulted in cases where scales were tipped in favour of the interests of the private property 
owners rather than in the public interest.68 Consequently, this has affected the state’s ability to 
implement land reform in that it often fails to comply with the balance inquiry as was applied 
by the CCSA in Du Toit. I thus contend that considering the values of section 12 of the pre-
constitutionally entrenched Expropriation Act are not in line with the constitutional values 
underpinning section 25, this section of the Act should be amended to facilitate constitutionally 
mandated land redistribution, which will in turn influence the courts’ approach to determining 
compensation amounts by eradicating its market value-centred approach to expropriation. 
Continuing to use a market value-centred approach to expropriate land for reform purposes may 
restrict the state from carrying out an effective land reform programme, owing to the possibility 
that expropriation taken in terms of the market value-centred approach, may not reflect a just 
and equitable balance between opposing parties as required by section 25(3). In addition, this 
may result in the state’s unwillingness to advance expropriation-centred land reform 
programmes as being expected to expropriate land on a large-scale basis against market 
value/above market value may be too expensive for the state.69 The Expropriation Act’s 
adoption of the willing seller/willing buyer compensation formula contributes towards the state 
extending greater protection to private property rights as per section 25(1) and thus entrenches 
the pre-constitutional (formalistic) approach towards expropriation which is based on the belief 
that if a person is deprived of their land, they must be compensated for the worth of their land. 
A shift from this approach would thus speed up the land reform process as it would foster the 
state’s realisation that expropriating land against nil or nominal compensation to advance the 
socio-economic status of previously disadvantaged individuals is constitutionally permissible, 
when section 25(3) is read with section 25(8). I contend that the reading together of these 
sections envisions a flexible approach towards determining compensation amounts that are 
based on the notion that expropriation against nil or nominal compensation may be considered 
just and equitable. This flexible approach will assist the state in reducing the expense and delay 
of needing to develop a redistribution programme based on expropriation.70 The reading 
together of these sections needs to be tested at CCSA level in order for this progressive mode 
of constitutional application to be accepted by lower courts. However, such constitutional 
application depends on the courts’ willingness to place a larger emphasis on purposive 
interpretation when dealing with expropriation cases for land reform purposes.  
 
68 Basajjasubi op cit note 46 at 48. 
69 G Budlender ‘The right to equitable access to land’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 295 at 303. 
70 Basajjasubi op cit note 46 at 52. 
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2.3 Section 25(8) – No provision of section 25 may impede the state from taking legislative 
and other measures to achieve land reform 
Section 25(8) gives rise to the possibility that the state may pursue a more assertive 
approach to land reform. I contend that this includes allowing land redistribution through 
expropriation against nil or nominal compensation. In addition, I contend that expropriating 
land against nil or nominal compensation is possible without needing to amend the Constitution, 
provided that the rationale behind such expropriation is to uphold the land reform aspirations 
of section 25(8). The requirement of just and equitable compensation according to section 25(3) 
provides a transformative method which, if interpreted purposively to balance property rights, 
may require the awarding of nil or nominal compensation. However, section 25(8) can also be 
interpreted to allow for expropriation against nil or nominal compensation for land reform 
purposes. Section 25(8) states that: 
 
‘No provision of this section [25] may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures 
to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance 
with the provisions of section 36(1).’ 
 
While this argument is yet to be explored through litigation, the wording of section 25(8) 
suggests that it is possible, should action be pursued, for laws to be enacted which allows the 
state to expropriate land against nil or nominal compensation for the purposes of land reform, 
provided that such expropriation is found to be ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’.71 The ability to use section 
25(8) to expropriate land against nil or nominal compensation for land reform purposes, 







71 Dugard op cit note 52 at 16. 
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Chapter 3 – Transformative constitutionalism and a legal culture that is committed to 
achieving land reform and socio-economic progression through a purposive approach to 
interpretation 
Following the period of land dispossession and extreme injustice resulting from 
discriminatory laws, emerged a new democratic system of laws governed by the Constitution 
and underpinned by a transformative mandate. I understand this mandate to be one that seeks 
to establish and give effect to a legal system that allows all citizens equal access to resources 
and services to be provided by the state. Hence, the Constitution’s aim is to commit the state to 
transforming our society into one which allows citizens access to social and economic resources 
that enables them to realise their self-worth and dignity,72 as opposed to merely declaring that 
a new system of democratic rights exists. This transformation can however only be achieved 
following the continuous commitment of all legal actors (especially the courts) in the legal 
system towards realising substantive and redistributive equality and justice, which entails a 
commitment to achieving equality which takes into account the lived socio-economic 
circumstances of all previously-disadvantaged people in South Africa.73 I contend that a solid 
starting point for achieving this transformation is through litigation (regarding the promotion 
of land reform in this case) and a shift in the courts’ approach to expropriation against 
compensation. The transformative mandate concerning property can only be fully achieved 
when the courts shift from a literal, formalist approach to interpreting the meaning of ‘just and 
equitable compensation’, to an increased purposive approach to interpreting the meaning of 
‘just and equitable compensation’. Utilising an increased purposive approach to interpreting 
section 25 and the requirement of just and equitable compensation will encourage the courts to 
adopt a flexible approach which allows for expropriation against nil or nominal compensation. 
Hence the need to commit to sustaining an on-going process of transformative 
constitutionalism. Such constitutionalism requires the adoption of a purposive interpretative 
approach that takes into account the underlying values of the Constitution when interpreting 





72 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA  850 (CC) para 132. 
73 K Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 at 154. 
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3.1 South Africa’s transformative mandate 
Transformative constitutionalism provides a legitimate platform that could enlighten 
legal actors on how to negotiate the tensions (which arise from the property clause) between 
the rights and interests of current and aspiring property owners. This notion of transformative 
constitutionalism was developed by Klare and refers to a type of constitutionalism which 
constitutes ‘a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation and 
enforcement…that aims to induce large-scale social change through non-violent political 
processes grounded in law’.74 He deduces that in some cases, mainstream legal culture acts as 
a restraint which resists transformation. Legal culture in this instance refers to ‘professional 
sensibilities, habits of mind and intellectual reflexes’75 ‘which are embedded in more or less 
uncritical acceptance of doing things the way they are usually done; the way they have been 
done for a long time’.76 The legal culture prior to the enactment of the Constitution 
encompassed a formalistic vision of law which ignored the interplay between law and politics 
upon applying the law.77 In the course of this dissertation, I aim to show that the courts’ literal 
approach to interpreting the Expropriation Act has influenced its approach to interpreting 
section 25 of the Constitution, and that this is a manifestation of the formalistic legal culture 
that Klare discusses. Legal actors have been trained to accept the intellectual reflexes of 
mainstream legal culture as the norm78 and thus do not realise that both their spoken and 
unspoken assumptions regarding legal problems, arguments and sources of authority are 
culturally determined.79 Klare discusses how this can act against transformative aspirations: 
 
‘This property of legal culture – that participants are often unaware of how it shapes their 
professional beliefs and practices – affects the substantive development of law. If cultural coding 
sets limits (however implicit or unconscious) on the types of questions lawyers ask and the types 
of evidence and argument they deem persuasive, surely this in turn sets limits on the kinds of 
answers the legal culture can generate … Un-self-conscious and unreflective reliance on the 
culturally available intellectual tools and instincts handed down from earlier times may exercise 
 
74 Ibid at 150. 
75 Ibid at 166. 
76 AJ van der Walt ‘Legal History, Legal Culture and Transformation in a Constitutional Democracy’ (2006) 12 
Fundamina 1 at 8. 
77 JC Froneman ‘Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture: Our “Vision of Law”’ (2005) 1 Stell LR 3. 
78 Klare op cit note 73 at 167. 
79 Van der Walt op cit note 76 at 17. 
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a drag on constitutional interpretation, weighing it down and limiting its ambition and 
achievements in democratic transformation.’80 
 
It is challenging to develop a transformed legal culture while making use of the tools, 
training and habits which frequented the pre-constitutional era.81 Transformation of the legal 
sector can only be attained if legal actors (especially the courts) acknowledge that legal culture 
restrains their ability to utilise law so as to produce effective change. Considering lawyers were 
trained to adopt a literal approach to interpretation under apartheid, it is not unusual for 
experienced lawyers to consciously or subconsciously employ a literal interpretative approach 
when drafting legal arguments. It is thus imperative for all legal actors (especially the courts) 
to develop their skills in utilising a purposive approach to interpretation, as considering 
substantive context and the purpose of section 25 will encourage the courts to adopt a flexible 
interpretation which allows for expropriation against compensation; against nil compensation 
or against nominal compensation (to be illustrated later on in Chapter 3). Similarly, the judiciary 
should constantly question how to achieve socio-economic transformation (in the form of land 
redistribution in this case) through using section 25, when the legal culture and the tools for 
implementing law as an agent of change have not completely evolved since the advent of 
constitutional democracy’.82  
 
In addition to transforming the legal culture, the transformative constitutional mandate 
requires that the Constitution be interpreted in a manner that advances its transformative goals. 
The constitutional principles which formed the foundation of the Final Constitution included 
the presumption that the Final Constitution would establish a system of governance that is 
committed to achieving equality before the law, and would thus make provision for laws 
designed specifically to enhance the deplorable conditions that majority of previously 
advantaged individuals still live in, despite the end of the apartheid era.83 From this, I deduce 
that the Constitution obliges the state to combat poverty and promote social welfare, through 
‘promoting the values that underpin a democratic society based on human dignity and 
equality,’84 and consequently, this obligation is extended to land reform (considering being 
 
80 Klare op cit note 73 at 168. 
81 Ibid at 171. 
82 Du Plessis op cit note 8 at 6. 
83 Klare op cit note 73 at 154. 
84 Sections 1(a) and 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
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awarded land that you/your ancestors were stripped from is inherently linked to your human 
dignity). The transformative constitutional mandate, in recognising this obligation, thus 
promotes the realisation of substantive and redistributive equality in attempt to reduce the 
effects that apartheid had on previously disadvantaged individuals. This can be attained through 
implementing methods such as expropriation against nil or nominal compensation for land 
reform purposes in order to facilitate and speed up the redistribution of land process and 
ultimately, to improve the socio-economic conditions of previously disadvantaged individuals. 
This method of expropriating land manifests the Constitution’s transformative goal to 
implement reasonable measures to redress the land dispossession caused by past racial 
discrimination; and to enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis as set out in 
section 25. 
 
Klare acknowledged that transformative constitutionalism can be restricted by the static 
legal culture that still reflects some remnants of the land-related apartheid laws and thus resists 
transformation.85 He argues that by committing to the ongoing project of transformative 
constitutionalism, the goal of utilising the Constitution such that it produces positive effects on 
the lives of previously disadvantaged and disadvantaged individuals can be realised.86 Upon 
examining the courts’ interpretation of just and equitable compensation in our constitutional 
democracy, it is clear that the literal, formalistic approach that was utilised to interpret property 
law under apartheid has influenced the interpretation and application of section 25. 
Consequently, this has influenced how section 25 and its purpose has in turn influenced the 
progression of socio-economic development in land reform to the extent that it differs from the 
ideals of transformative constitutionalism, considering the formalistic legal culture behind 
interpreting property law which obstructs the transformative aspirations for land reform.87 
However, despite this formalistic approach towards the constitutional interpretation and 
application of property law, section 25 establishes the necessary framework to be used to 
develop a legal culture that promotes and facilitates land and related socio-economic reform.88 
This can be done by using section 25 as a mechanism to facilitate the transformation of existing 
property law which still depends largely on traditional rules that often require a literal 
 
85 Klare op cit note 73 at 150. 
86 Ibid. 




interpretation to protect private ownership; thus perpetuating a formalistic legal culture.89 The 
transformed legal culture that Klare envisions can best be developed through the use of a 
purposive judicial interpretative approach, as taking our nation’s history of land dispossession 
into account will encourage legal actors to draft arguments that are in favour of previously 
disadvantaged individuals; thus giving effect to the transformative aims of the Constitution i.e. 
land restitution and redistribution.90  
 
The fundamental question to be asked from a transformative constitutional perspective 
with regards to awarding compensation for expropriation is how to invoke the property clause 
in such a manner that it transforms the property relations between existing and aspiring property 
owners in attempt to level the economic playing field between them.91 Property law can be used 
not only to reform the existing spatial planning but also to foster economic growth. It is thus 
imperative that all legal actors (especially the courts) abandon a strict reliance on the traditional 
rules of property law without considering the substantive elements that come with it. The 
constitutional democracy requires the development of sufficient guidelines on how to make the 
tension between vested property rights and reform and redistribution work innovatively.92 Such 
innovation requires that courts promote the egalitarian values enshrined in the Constitution 
through adopting an increased purposive interpretative approach to determining compensation 
amounts, as this will allow for the expropriation of land against compensation; against nil 
compensation or against nominal compensation. 
 
3.2 A purposive approach to legal interpretation 
3.2.1 The Constitutional Court’s adoption of a purposive approach to interpretation 
The CCSA in FNB v Minister of Finance93 confirmed that the South African 
Constitution is committed to an on-going process of transformation by referring to Van der 
Walt in that ‘[w]hen considering the purpose and content of the property clause it is necessary 
to move away from a static, typically private-law conceptualist view of the Constitution as a 
guarantee of the status quo to a dynamic, typically public-law view of the Constitution as an 
 
89 AJ Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2005) at 402. 
90 Basajjasubi op cit note 46 at 6. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Van der Walt op cit note 89 at 408. 
93 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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instrument for social change and transformation under the auspices of entrenched constitutional 
values’.94 The CCSA’s endorsement of using the Constitution as ‘an instrument for social 
change and transformation’ indicates that the Court should take South Africa’s context into 
account in its approach to interpretation. Utilising a purposive approach to interpretation would 
be the most effective way to achieve the type of transformation envisioned by the Constitution, 
as such an approach considers the purpose behind why laws were enacted. Considering South 
African legislation is centred on recognising past injustices and attempting to correct the wrongs 
of the past, evaluating the purpose of section 25 and related property laws will encourage legal 
actors (especially the courts) to draft legal arguments that promote land reform. The 
commitment to transformation through a purposive approach to interpretation was further 
entrenched by the CCSA in Soobramoney v Minister of Health95 whereby the Court held that 
the Constitution aspires to transform our society into one in which human dignity, freedom and 
equality are realised.96 Hence the need for a purposive approach to interpreting ‘just and 
equitable compensation’ such that it recognises the link between land and human dignity by 
allowing for expropriation against nil or nominal compensation for land reform purposes. The 
CCSA’s decision to develop such an approach to interpretation indicates its understanding of 
the Constitution’s foundational values. 
 
A purposive approach to interpretation entails a process whereby a court considers the 
underlying links between the Constitution and its historical context, so as to infer unambiguous 
meanings from the text.97 Such an interpretation allows a court to identify the underlying values 
of the Bill of Rights and use these values to inform its analysis of the text in a manner that 
upholds the Constitution’s aim of ensuring an effective transition to democracy that fosters 
equal opportunities for all citizens,98 and is thus the most appropriate mode of constitutional 
interpretation, considering it aims to give effect to the foundational aims of the Constitution as 
set out in the Preamble. 
 
 
94 Ibid at 794. The CCSA referred to AJ Van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause: A Comparative 
Analysis of Section 25 of the South African Constitution of 1996 (1997) 11. 
95 Soobramoney v Minister of Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
96 Ibid paras 770I-771A. 
97 Zimmerman op cit note 61 at 390. 
98 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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In comparison, following my contention in favour of an increased purposive approach 
to interpreting section 25 and related property laws, I feel it necessary to refer to the literal 
approach to interpretation in order to evaluate the formalistic effects that this approach can have 
when dealing with the determination of just and equitable compensation. A literal approach to 
interpretation requires the interpreter to focus on the plain meaning that can be deduced from 
the language used in a provision, and only allows him to deviate from the literal meaning in 
cases where the meaning is ambiguous or vague.99 Utilising this narrow interpretation in the 
determination of ‘just and equitable compensation’ has resulted in the courts attaching market 
value to the term ‘just and equitable’.100 Our pre-constitutional era saw legal actors foster the 
notion that the sale or transfer of land ownership could only be considered a ‘just’ transaction 
provided that the landowner was compensated down to the last cent that the land was worth in 
economic terms. This narrow view of what was considered just and equitable compensation for 
land meant that any other aids to interpretation that were used to establish contextual meaning 
were overlooked. In using this approach, judges were thus afforded the opportunity to hide 
behind the law in that they became mechanical interpreters of the law who merely equated the 
literal meaning of ‘just and equitable compensation’ with monetary value and applied this law 
in related property law cases. Considering the mechanical interpretation that takes place when 
using a literal interpretative approach, the courts’ ability to consider context and thus interpret 
and apply property laws on a case by case basis is reduced. This in turn reduces the courts’ 
capacity to develop a precedent that gives effect to the transformative values of the Constitution. 
This literal approach to interpreting the term ‘just and equitable compensation’ should therefore 
not be relied on in our post-constitutional era. Owing to the historical interpretation of the term, 
it is more likely to produce favourable outcomes for previously and presently advantaged 
landowners through the awarding of compensation amounts that are at or above market value. 
Finally, considering the historical interpretation of the term ‘just and equitable compensation’ 
equated just compensation with monetary value, utilising a literal interpretation of the term is 
more likely to stunt the possibility of interpreting section 25 to include expropriation against 
nil or nominal compensation. 
 
 
99 L Du Plessis ‘Theoretical (Dis-)Position and Strategic Leitmotivs in Constitutional Interpretation in South 
Africa’ (2018) PER/PELJ 1332 at 1335. 
100 Du Toit supra note 11. 
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3.2.2 A purposive approach to interpreting section 25 of the Constitution – an academic 
perspective 
The Final Constitution possesses socio-economic and cultural transformative ideals that 
underpin its aim to implement institutional transformation within our democratic state by 
making decisions that uphold its founding values, namely, human dignity, equality, advancing 
human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism.101 Such transformation extends to 
the requirement for a major shift in the land ownership regime; transformation which is 
provided for in the reformist sections of the Constitution. However, despite room for land 
reform through expropriation, the courts have been reluctant to decide in favour of this pathway 
to transformation. This is owing to the courts’ preference for a literal approach to interpretation 
when determining just and equitable compensation amounts, which consequently restrains the 
above mentioned sections from carrying out their reformist jobs.  
 
The text of section 25 indicates that the Constitution aims to implement land reform by 
providing a normative framework that aims to provide access to land on an equitable basis,102 
redress those whose tenure of land is legally insecure owing to past racial discriminatory 
laws,103 provide restitution to those who were dispossessed of property owing to past racial 
discriminatory laws,104 and to prevent any provision of this section from impeding the state 
from taking measures to achieve land reform to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination.105 Section 25(8) is particularly important, as it insulates land reform from 
constitutional attack by providing that ‘no provision of this section may impede the state from 
taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to 
redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the previous 
section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1)’. This provision ensures that the 
structuring process of land reform programmes are prevented from being influenced by legal 
and political culture.106 In addition, the reformist sections 25(5)-(8) guide the CCSA in its 
interpretation and reading of the values that underpin the substantive aspects of the property 
clause.107 The inclusion of these substantive sections indicate that the property clause, in its 
 
101 Sections 1(a)-(b) of the Constitution. 
102 Section 25(5) of the Constitution. 
103 Section 25(6) of the Constitution. 
104 Section 25(7) of the Constitution. 
105 Section 25(8) of the Constitution. 
106 Basajjasubi op cit note 46 at 26-27. 
107 Ibid at 27. 
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entirety, should be interpreted in a manner that takes constitutional values and historical context 
into account. Hence, the Court becomes empowered to adopt a purposive interpretation of 
section 25 which allows it to interpret private property rights such that it does not prevent the 
state from carrying out land reform.108 
 
Klare and Zimmerman have published literature whereby they address the role of 
sections 25(2), 25(3) and 25(8) in implementing expropriation for land reform purposes, while 
respecting the rights of individuals to not be deprived of their property. Their literature centres 
on the transformative elements of section 25 and reflects on the effects that the current legal 
culture has had on the ability to use section 25 as an agent of transformation.109 Furthermore, it 
unpacks the need to develop alternative modes of interpreting property law in light of the 
constitutional obligation to promote land reform.110 Their literature is imperative to 
acknowledge when considering my argument as they discuss the need for the state to widen its 
scope in its approach to land reform i.e. by expropriating land against compensation below 
market value for the purposes of land reform.  
 
Klare’s literature forms a solid foundation for understanding why legal culture plays a 
vital role in whether transformative constitutionalism is pursued in our constitutional 
democracy. 111 Consequently, his argument provides the base upon which an analytical 
framework can be built, and whereby the processes of law-making, adjudication and legal 
culture can be analysed critically to determine how effectively these processes work as modes 
in developing alternative methods of land reform such as expropriation against nil or nominal 
compensation. Furthermore, he emphasises that the relationship between legal culture and the 
three branches of government often influences the way in which section 25 is interpreted and 
thus how the reformist sections are applied. Under our constitutional dispensation, property law 
remains largely defined by the traditional rules of property which aim to give effect to private 
ownership at the expense of land reform.112  
 
 
108 Zimmerman op cit note 61 at 392. 
109 Basajjasubi op cit note 46 at 16. 
110 Van der Walt op cit note 63 at 31-32. 
111 Klare op cit note 73 at 147. 
112 Basajjasubi op cit note 46 at 18. 
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As witnessed in Du Toit, this has a deterring effect on the transformative potential of 
section 25 insofar as land reform is concerned. Hence the need for the courts to embrace an 
increased purposive interpretation of just and equitable compensation, as having due regard for 
historical context will lead them down the path of expropriating land against nil or nominal 
compensation for land reform purposes. In favouring a purposive interpretation of the term ‘just 
and equitable’ compensation, the courts should link the transformative values underpinning 
section 25 directly with the reformist sections of section 25 in their legal reasoning of 
expropriation cases, as this will encourage the courts to realise the transformative potential of 
section 25. In addition, this will produce ‘a legal framework through which socio-economic 
transformation (in relation to land) receives constitutional justification through law and 
policy’113 and lead to the adoption of laws that entrench a more equitable system of land reform 
rights.114 Consequently, this will break down the literal, formalist approach that the courts have 
maintained (through a preference for market value-centred expropriation) and allow the courts 
to determine nil or nominal compensation amounts as ‘just and equitable’, thus speeding up the 
land reform process in South Africa 
 
Upon considering Klare’s position on transformative constitutionalism and legal 
culture, Zimmerman analyses whether expropriation for land reform purposes may be 
constitutionally permissible.115 Zimmerman concurs with Klare in that section 25 of the 
Constitution ‘possesses a principal characteristic that fundamentally expands and reinforces the 
ideals of a commitment to transformation within the legal realities of society’.116 These include, 
reference to the legal realities surrounding restructuring an equitable system of land rights 
through expropriation and land redistribution.117 
 
Zimmerman deduces that the Constitution was created to ensure that the limits 
concerning land reform are flexible, in attempt to give effect to the constitutional aim to achieve 
social justice and transformation in stating that ‘the flexible limits of constitutionally 




115 Zimmerman op cit note 61. 
116 Basajjasubi op cit note 46 at 19. 
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a substantive period of resource redistribution’.118 In using the term ‘flexibility’, she is referring 
to section 25’s ability to maintain a balance between protecting private property interests and 
what she calls the ‘special constitutional priority’ of promoting land reform in the public 
interest. She thus extends the substantive language used in the reformist subsections 25(5)-(8) 
to the defensive subsections 25(2)-(3) by arguing that the textual synergy between the 
subsections can be understood as ‘providing a springboard for a more substantive form of 
redistribution’.119 It is thus imperative that the courts read the requirement of just and equitable 
compensation under section 25(3) together with the need to achieve land reform under section 
25(8) through a purposive lens, as this will result in the realisation (based on substantive 
context) that expropriating land against nil or nominal compensation where necessary will 
speed up the land reform process, as the state will have no budgetary restraints holding it back 
from expropriating land for public benefit. Hence, land can be transferred quickly and easily. 
 
Upon establishing that section 25 bears transformative undertones which allow for 
expropriation for land reform purposes, it is important to enquire how sections 25(2)-(3) and 
25(8) can be utilised to give effect to its transformative aims. In making this enquiry, 
Zimmerman goes further than Klare in arguing that the transformative aims of the 
abovementioned sections are capable of being interpreted by the CCSA as characterising 
appropriate mechanisms for land reform related expropriation, owing to its special 
constitutional priority which justifies the state expropriating land against compensation that is 
below market value.120 It is fundamental for the courts to tap into the transformative potential 
of section 25 by allowing expropriation against nil or nominal compensation for land reform 
purposes, considering the lack of programmes concerning expropriation for land redistribution, 
as this will deter the courts from using market value as a starting point when determining 
compensation amounts for expropriation. The take home point from Zimmerman’s literature is 
the importance that purposive interpretation plays in giving effect to the transformative aims of 
the Constitution and ensuring that land related legislation and policies are underpinned by 
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Following the competent analyses conducted by these academics, I contend that while 
the courts do aim to strike a balance between using both a purposive and literal approach to 
interpretation, it is necessary for the courts to place more weight on a purposive approach when 
interpreting the law in expropriation cases. Matters concerning land are so intrinsically linked 
with dignity in South Africa, owing to our deplorable history of land dispossession. It is thus 
crucial for the courts to take active steps towards ensuring that land reform is implemented, and 
the best way to achieve outcomes which promote a speedier land reform process is through 
using an interpretative approach that takes active steps to guard against repeating the mistakes 
of the past. In addition, consistently taking into account the purpose of property laws and section 
25 will reinforce a precedent that our historical context must always be taken into account by 
the courts when dealing with expropriation cases, as the courts are the most effective 
mechanism to be used as agents of social change who act in favour of the public interest in 
ensuring favourable outcomes for disadvantaged people in expropriation cases. This will 
reinforce the notion that substantive equality must be realised in our constitutional era and that 
favourable outcomes which promote substantive equality can only be achieved if we constantly 
remind ourselves of the wrongs of the past that need to be corrected. Adopting this approach is 
the starting point to breaking down the formalistic market value-centred approach to 
interpreting section 25 and related property laws. Consequently, this will give direct effect to 
the transformative aims of the Constitution; one of the most fundamental aims being the need 













Chapter 4 – South African courts’ approach to expropriation cases when determining 
‘just and equitable’ compensation under section 25(3) 
Following on from Chapter 2 and my discussion on the courts’ position regarding ‘just 
and equitable compensation’, I will now further this discussion by analysing the courts’ inapt 
approach to interpreting section 25 by considering the various levels of courts’ approach to 
determining compensation amounts in the Msiza cases. As previously discussed, I deduce that 
the courts’ interpretative approach in these cases harbour a formalistic approach towards 
expropriating land for reform purposes owing to its market value-centred approach to 
determining compensation amounts. This has resulted in a stagnant land reform process which 
needs to change in order to give effect to the underlying values of section 25 and to produce 
more expropriated land for reform purposes.  
 
4.1 The Land Claims Court and Supreme Court of Appeal’s jurisprudence on 
determining just and equitable compensation with regards to land reform in the Msiza 
cases 
4.1.1 The Land Claims Court’s legal interpretative approach in the Msiza cases 
The Land Claims Court (LCC) has, similarly to the CCSA, adopted a market value-
centred approach to determining compensation amounts upon the expropriation of land.122 
Considering the LCC was established in 1996 under the Restitution Act123 for the sole purpose 
of dealing with cases concerning land restitution, it is expected that this Court would promote 
a transformative ethos. However, the outcomes of the LCC’s decisions are generally 
characterised as ‘un-transformative’.124 In his commentary on land reform, academics such as 
Roux have concluded that the LCC, while pro-poor in nature, provides little comfort to the poor 
 
122 University of the Witwatersrand ‘Jurisprudence of the Land Claims Court in land reform against the backdrop 
of the current calls for the amendment of section 25 of the Constitution’ Constitutional Court Review (2018) 1 at 
2. 
123 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. 
124 University of the Witwatersrand op cit note 123 at note 2 – T Roux ‘Pro-Poor Court, Anti-Poor Outcomes: 
Explaining the Performance of the South African Land Claims Court’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 511 notes that ten years 
after the Land Claims Courts’ establishment it plays no meaningful role in the restitution process. Fast forward 
to 2019, the land reform process remains slow-moving, hence the need to give effect to expropriation without 
compensation (as monetary implications are generally the cause for delays in our economic system). Roux 
makes reference to R Hall, who expresses his disappointment on the performance of the Land Claims Court and 
points out that this Court’s conservative outcomes defy the very reason for its existence in that “There was a 
need for a specialist court with people who had a specialist understanding and knowledge and that it would have 
to function in a different way from normal courts. So we are talking about a specialist court that was set up to 
deal with the complex and highly contested political issue and to not behave in an ordinary way. This is an 
important context.”  
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majority whom it is meant to assist.125 While the CCSA can be commended for its commitment 
to producing pro-poor outcomes, the South African legal culture and formalism have negatively 
influenced the LCC’s interpretation of land reform legislation which has consequently stunted 
the land reform process. Hence the need for the courts, at all levels, to adopt an increased 
purposive approach to interpreting section 25(3), as utilising this interpretative approach will 
encourage allowing for expropriation against nil or nominal compensation and thus foster the 
need to give effect to this section’s socio-economic transformative ideals. 
 
Roux’s critique of the LCC’s performance during the first decade of its existence 
concludes that a formalistic legal culture explains the jurisprudence of this court.126 His 
argument is based on the transformative role of the judiciary in new democracies through 
assessing the courts’ performance in being agents of social transformation.127 For the purposes 
of this dissertation, social transformation refers to ‘the altering of structural inequalities and 
power relations in society in ways that reduces the weight of morally irrelevant circumstances, 
such as socio-economic status/class, gender, race, religion or sexual orientation’.128 
Considering the LCC is expected to play a direct role in ensuring land reform through land 
restitution, this court is expected to be an agent of social transformation. It is my contention 
that the LCC is a pro-poor court whose judgments have not generally benefitted the poor. In 
relying on Roux, I contend that there are a number of institutional indicators which further 
determine whether a court is an agent of transformation and these include, ‘the legislative 
framework enabling the courts to transform and the social composition of the judiciary that 
should ensure this social transformation; the resource indicators reflected in the ability of the 
litigants to approach the courts; the location of the court; the access to courts as informed by 
the cost of litigation; and the pro-poor voice representation flowing from the extent to which 
poor people’s voices are represented in the matters brought before the courts’.129 Upon 
considering these institutional indicators, the LCC can be considered an agent of social change 
theoretically, as the cases that appear before it include mostly poor people, represented by 
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transformative legislation [including the Restitution of Land Rights Act  of 1994, Land Reform 
(Labour Tenants) Act of 1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997].130  
 
Despite the existence of these pro-poor instruments which can be utilised to ensure 
social transformation, the recent Msiza cases illustrate that the LCC has a long way to go before 
it can be considered fully transformative. However, before analysing the LCC’s decisions in 
the Msiza cases, it is necessary to consider how neo-institutionalism has reinforced the ever-
persistent formalistic legal culture in this court’s post-apartheid jurisprudence. Neo-
institutionalism falls under the discipline of Sociology and refers to the study of institutions, 
their development and the ways in which they gain legitimacy within the environment in which 
they operate.131 Considering the LCC was established to perform a specific function within the 
limits of its empowering legislation, this court can be categorised as an institution which, as a 
specialist court, needs to maintain legitimacy in our judicial system. A neo-institutional 
assessment of the LCC views this institution as a reflection of the socio-political values that 
surrounds it.132 Hence, the outcomes of the LCC’s decisions reflect South Africa’s socio-
political approach to land reform and ‘the impact of this court’s jurisprudence on land reform 
should [thus] be viewed from the perspective of the larger socio-political climate in which land 
reform plays out’.133 Consequently, the socio-political climate in which the LCC operates, 
including the influence of superior courts, has shaped the LCC’s approach to determining 
compensation amounts in expropriation cases and shaped the outcomes of its decisions. 
 
 The Msiza case involved a land dispute between two parties, the Msiza family being the 
applicant (represented by Msindo Msiza) and Johannes Uys being the respondent. The 
applicant’s father lodged a land claim in 1996 in terms of the Labour Reform (Labour Tenants) 
Act. The owner at the time received notice of the claim in terms of section 17 of the Act but 
argued that the deceased (Msindo’s father, Amos) fell into the category of ‘labour tenant’. This 
case was disputed for the first time at the LCC in 2001 and the court held in 2004 that Amos 
Msiza was in fact a labour tenant and awarded the land and servitudes to the Msiza family.134 
Following the handing down of this judgment, the state told Msindo that they were awaiting a 
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market evaluation of the farm in order to make an offer to purchase. However, this did not take 
place for 12 years.135 
 
In 2004, the state made offers to purchase the land at market value at both R400 000 
and R550 000, both of which were rejected. Msindo thus went to court for the second time in 
the LCC in 2016 to request an order to determine the compensation amount in terms of sections 
22 and 23 of the Labour Reform Act.136 The LCC determined that the market value of the 
property was R1 800 000 and that just and equitable compensation amounted to R1 500 000. 
This judgment was however overturned by the SCA in Uys NO v Msiza, wherein the full market 
value of R 1 800 000 was awarded.137 
 
 Despite the land being transferred to the Msiza family and the owner of the land being 
awarded its full market value compensation amount, there are several issues that were not 
addressed by the courts in their respective decisions. First, pre-constitutional expropriation law 
used market value as the determining factor when calculating the compensation amounts in the 
expropriation cases. This perpetuated the belief that awarding landowners the market value of 
their property was the most just and equitable form of compensation. However, this notion of 
just and equitable compensation placed white landowners’ private property interests at the 
frontline of their compensation calculations and disregarded the need to compensate the black 
majority of South Africa from whom the land was initially stolen. It is thus crucial that we move 
away from this formalistic notion of using market value as the starting point or determining 
factor when determining compensation amounts. Continuing to use this approach when 
determining compensation amounts does not give effect to the intention of all the factors listed 
in section 25(3), which are to be considered equally together, hence one factor should not be 
considered above the rest. Second, using market value as a determining factor when 
determining just and equitable compensation amounts reinforces commercialisation and adds 
capitalist undertones to section 25. This does not fit well with the Constitution as a whole, which 
is restorative in nature. I acknowledge the importance of having a well-oiled economy in our 
country. However, as confirmed in Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa,138 
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using returns on investment when dealing with cases concerning the historical loss of land is 
likely to result in overcompensation. Hence, market value should not be used as the determining 
factor when determining just and equitable compensation amounts to be awarded in 
expropriation cases. 
 
The socio-political climate in recent years favours a more robust approach to land 
reform; that being the need for expropriation without compensation. Considering this status 
quo, and the fact that the LCC’s mandate is to act in favour of land restitution, it was 
inappropriate for the court to utilise a literal, formalist approach when interpreting just and 
equitable compensation in the Msiza cases. However, given the precedent set by the CCSA in 
Du Toit, I understand why the LCC felt restricted by the reasoning set out by the superior court. 
The LCC’s decision not to stray from the CCSA’s judgment in Du Toit, despite its 
transformative mandate, hints at issues of legitimacy. It is probable that the LCC, in being a 
specialist court, feels the need to limit its decisions from being ‘too progressive’ in order to 
maintain institutional capacity in the eyes of public. However, considering the LCC aims to 
serve the poor majority of South Africa, it is necessary for the court to consider that limiting 
itself from making progressive decisions would not only have a negative socio-economic 
impact on the lives of poor people, but could also reinforce a negative perception of the judicial 
system in that it does the bare minimum to assist the destitute and is thus not doing what it was 
established to do. Ultimately, ‘the success trajectory of the LCC is influenced by the goals of 
the transition, that will inevitably play out in the outcomes and the direct impact on the litigants 
before the Court.’139  
 
4.1.2 The Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretative approach in Uys NO v Msiza 
In Uys NO v Msiza, the SCA on appeal adopted two methods which, in practice, makes 
market value the determining factor when calculating just and equitable compensation amounts, 
thus undermining the CCSA’s principle in Du Toit that ‘section 25(3) does not give market 
value a central role’.140 These methods include: (a) the two-stage approach; and (b) the 
prohibition on double counting.141  
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Method 1: The two-stage approach 
The SCA held that courts must adopt a two-stage approach to determining just and 
equitable compensation. In the first step, the court should determine the market value of the 
property. In the second step, the court should determine whether that value should be adjusted 
up or down, in light of the other factors listed in section 25(3). The justification for this approach 
is that market value is the only factor which can be objectively quantified.142 
 
I concur with the reasoning of Bishop and Ngcukaitobi in that the two-stage approach 
is mistaken and that if the case is taken on appeal to the CCSA, the Court is likely to reject it.143 
First, market value is not the only factor that can produce a numerical value. In addition, the 
amount of state subsidy may also be determined and produces a concrete value.144 Second, this 
two-stage approach is inconsistent with the written text of section 25(3) in that it can lead to the 
courts’ disregard for other equally important factors. This in turn disregards that the goal is not 
‘market value’ but ‘just and equitable’ compensation.145 Third, the notion that market value can 
be objectively determined is false, as it is often the case that valuers disagree on the value of 
land.146 Fourth, in cases where there is a dispute regarding the market value, it will usually be 
more difficult to detach the other factors listed in section 25(3) from a market value 
determination.147 ‘Assessing market value requires the court to consider not only the current, 
actual value of the land, but also what the value would have been but for the expropriation.’148 
This therefore requires an assessment that is inextricably linked to ‘the current use of the 
property’ [s 25(3)(a)], ‘the history of the acquisition and use of the property’ [s 25(3)(b)], and 
‘the purpose of the expropriation’ [s 25(3)(e)].   
 
Method 2: Double Counting 
The SCA overturned the LCC’s decision and held that the various factors considered by 
the LCC to justify the reduction had initially been considered by the valuer, and that it was thus 
inappropriate to consider these factors again (in determining a just and equitable compensation 
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amount).149 While this approach was considered plausible by the SCA, I concur with Bishop 
and Ngcukaitobi in that this decision is likely to be overturned at CCSA level for three reasons. 
First, section 25(3) explicitly states that the listed factors should be considered, knowing that 
some of these factors would obviously be relevant in determining the market value.150 Second, 
the weight that each of these factors should hold must be determined by the Court in its 
determination of a just and equitable compensation amount, not by the valuer in her market 
valuer determination.151 Even if both the Court and the valuer consider the same factors, the 
purpose underlying their respective considerations will vary. Third, owing to our country’s 
history of land dispossession and the purpose of section 25(3), the factors which look at history 
of the acquisition and use of the property and the purpose of expropriation should hold a heavier 
weight than market value. However, the SCA made no mention of South Africa’s historical 
context in its judgment, which indicates its reluctance to stray from a market value-centred 
approach and illustrates that the Court had no intention of using its authority to pave the way, 
through its reasoning, for a property law regime that fosters the transformative values 
underpinning section 25(3). 
 
4.1.3 Uys NO v Msiza should be overturned  
The judgment by the SCA in Uys NO v Msiza reflects the Court’s reluctance to let go 
of its hegemonic view on the central role that market value should play when determining just 
and equitable compensation amounts. This judgment was controversial, considering it 
reinforced that market value should be used as the starting point when determining a just and 
equitable compensation amount during a period where the socio-political climate is critical of 
using market value as the determining factor. This differs from the socio-political climate 
during the period of the Du Toit judgment where it was deemed acceptable to use market value 
as the starting point when determining a just and equitable compensation amount. 
 
The effect of a decision like Uys NO v Msiza, in using market value as not only a starting 
point but as the determining factor, is the precedent it has set that just and equitable 
compensation merely amounts to compensation at market value. Should this decision not be 
overturned, it will be almost insurmountable to convince the courts that just and equitable 
 
149 Uys NO v Msiza supra note 21 para 25. 




compensation could amount to nil or nominal compensation.152 Where the aim of expropriation 
is land reform, the awarding of a compensation amount at less than market value should be 
allowed. The fact that Uys NO v Msiza allows just and equitable compensation against market 
value will provide additional hurdles for the land reform process. Bishop and Ngcukaitobi have 
suggested three mechanisms which can be used to address the problems following this decision: 
 
‘The state or civil society could provide the Constitutional Court with an opportunity to 
overrule Msiza.  Unfortunately, the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform elected 
not to appeal the Msiza judgment.  Mr Msiza, too, will not lodge an appeal in the Constitutional 
Court.  If the Constitutional Court does not hear it, the Government or civil society should find 
an alternative test case to bring before the Constitutional Court. Alternatively, Parliament could 
pass legislation that expressly provides for an alternative mechanism to calculate just and 
equitable compensation at below market value (we suggest some possibilities below).  The 
Government could then defend that legislation on the grounds that: (a) Msiza was wrongly 
decided and the legislation is consistent with s 25(3); or (b) if it limits s 25(3), the limitation is 
justifiable under s 25(8). Lastly, Parliament could amend the Constitution to rewrite s 25(3) 
to allow for compensation significantly below market value in certain instances.’153 
 
Since the process to amend the Constitution such that it allows for expropriation without 
compensation is underway, it is uncertain whether this amendment will be made. In Chapter 5, 
I will discuss what these three mechanisms entail. I will then elaborate on why the third 
mechanism [which opts for the amendment of section 25(3) to allow for compensation 
significantly below market value/nominal compensation], can achieve the desired results 
through the existing wording of section 25(3), hence this section need not be amended. In order 
to give effect to expropriation against nominal compensation, the courts must place a larger 
emphasis on a purposive interpretation of section 25(3) and the meaning of ‘just and equitable’. 
Should the courts foster the transformative values underpinning section 25 as a whole, and more 
willingly develop the undeniable link between sections 25(2)-(3) and 25(8), it will realise that 
the underlying purpose of section 25 is to take the required reasonable measures to implement 
an effective land reform programme. Hence, expropriation against nil and nominal 
compensation is constitutionally permissible. While Bishop and Ngcukaitobi contend that 
 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid at 10-11. 
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Parliament should amend section 25(3) to allow for compensation significantly below market 
value, I argue that the Constitution need not be amended to allow for expropriation against nil 
or nominal compensation, provided that the courts place more weight on a purposive approach 
to interpretation when adjudicating expropriation cases for land reform purposes.  
 
The tension between these competing interests presented in the cases at LCC level 
versus at SCA level affects the jurisprudence of the LCC. Neo-institutionalism thus provides a 
differing perspective on this jurisprudence which assesses not only the legal culture of the LCC 
but also the socio-political climate within which the Court’s jurisprudence prevails. Once the 
LCC makes decisions in accordance with the current socio-political climate and acknowledges 
its privilege in being a specialist court and its ability to transform property law in South Africa, 
the LCC will strengthen its institutional capacity and could persuade superior courts to leave 
behind the notion of using market value as the determining factor in expropriation cases. It is 
thus imperative for a case concerning expropriation against just and equitable compensation to 
be tested at CCSA level under our current socio-political climate as Du Toit was decided at an 
early stage in the CCSA’s existence, hence the likelihood of the Court progressing and deciding 
in favour of expropriation against nil or nominal compensation is considerable. Once such a 
case is tested at CCSA level, it is likely that the LCC and SCA will follow suit when determining 












Chapter 5 – Can ‘expropriation without compensation’ or ‘expropriation with nominal 
compensation’ be considered ‘just and equitable’ under the current structure of section 
25? 
In this dissertation, I have deduced that based on the existing wording of section 25 it is 
constitutionally permissible for the state to expropriate land against nil or nominal 
compensation. I have considered a formalistic, market value-centred approach to determining 
just and equitable compensation amounts and deduced that such an approach does not further 
the land reform aims of section 25. Hence, in order to give effect to the land reform aims of this 
section, and to speed up the land redistribution process, it is necessary for the state to 
expropriate land against nil or nominal compensation through an increased purposive approach 
to interpreting section 25. In this Chapter, I will illustrate how the requirement of ‘just and 
equitable compensation’ can include expropriation against nil or nominal compensation. I 
contend that just and equitable compensation can be interpreted to include whichever 
compensation amount the court deems fit and will argue in favour of adopting a flexible 
approach to awarding just and equitable compensation, which allows for expropriation against 
nil compensation, expropriation against nominal compensation, expropriation at market value 
and expropriation at above market value.  
 
5.1 What does ‘expropriation without compensation’ mean? 
The Draft Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill which aims to allow for the 
expropriation of land without compensation was gazetted on 13 December 2019.154 This 
Amendment Bill states that its purpose is ‘to amend section 25 of the Constitution so as to 
provide that the right to property may be limited in such a way that where land is expropriated 
for land reform, the amount of compensation may be nil’.155 The proposed amendment of 
section 25 is set up as follows:156 
 
(a) by the substitution in subsection (2) for paragraph (b) of the following paragraph:  
 
154 D Erasmus ‘Land reform: speak up now!’ Farmer’s Weekly 10 January 2020, available at 
https://www.farmersweekly.co.za/opinion/blog/letter-from-the-editor/land-reform-speak-up-now/, accessed on 
14 January 2020. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill, 13 December 2019. 
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‘‘(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which 
have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court: Provided that in 
accordance with subsection (3A) a court may, where land and any improvements thereon are 
expropriated for the purposes of land reform, determine that the amount of compensation is nil.’’;  
(b) by the substitution in subsection (3) for the words preceding paragraph (a) of the following words:  
‘‘(3) The amount of the compensation as contemplated in subsection (2)(b), and the time and 
manner of any payment, must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the 
public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, 
including—’’; and  
(c) by the insertion after subsection (3) of the following subsection:  
‘‘(3A) National legislation must, subject to subsections (2) and (3), set out specific circumstances 
where a court may determine that the amount of compensation is nil.’’ 
 
5.2 Using section 25(8) of the Constitution to expropriate land for reform purposes 
Owing to the principle of subsidiarity, someone who wishes to exercise a constitutional 
right must rely on legislation that purports to give effect to the right before relying directly on 
the constitutional provision.157 Subsections 25(5)-(9) states that the government must adopt 
legislation and other reasonable measures to achieve land reform, hence land reform should be 
facilitated in accordance with legislative measures prior to invoking the Constitution directly. 
 
However, section 25(8) authorises a departure from the rest of the provisions in section 
25, provided that the departure is in accordance with section 36(1) of the Constitution. Section 
25(8) states that: 
 
‘No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to 
achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, 
provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions 
of section 36(1).’ 
 
I contend that ‘section 25(8) clearly envisions categories of expropriated land for which 
“market value” should not factor into the compensation analysis’.158 However, where a 
 
157 SAHRC op cit note 4 at 11. 
158 Zimmerman op cit note 61 at 415-416. 
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departure is made for the purpose of land redistribution in accordance with section 36(1), 
proportionality requires that the court take into account the welfare of the expropriatees.159 It 
may very well be justifiable to waive the consideration of market value where the family that 
is subject to the expropriation holds a significant amount of land wealth. 160 Ultimately, it is 
important to remember that the fundamental purpose of the Constitution is to redress the harsh 
socio-economic effects that our deplorable past has had on majority of South Africans; hence 
the need to interpret section 25(8) purposively such that expropriation at nil or nominal 
compensation, with the aim of producing a speedier land reform process, can be achieved. 
 
In analysing the construction of section 25(8), Budlender et al have raised an interesting 
argument.161 They contend that the juxtaposition of the first and second sentences of the section 
renders the provision inadequate, considering the provision is a product of compromise during 
the negotiation period whereby the ANC’s aim was to ensure that individual property rights did 
not restrict land reform, versus the NP’s goal which was to protect white individual property 
rights from unfair expropriation.162 While this argument appears to be plausible in its taking of 
context into account, I contend that the objectives set out in section 25(8) are clear. First, section 
25(8) must influence the interpretation of sections 25(2)-(3). Hence, deprivations that are 
conducted for land reform purposes will not be arbitrary and the limitations placed on the courts 
in section 25(2)(b) must be more considerate when dealing with land reform issues. Second, 
section 25(8) should influence the outcome of a determination for just and equitable 
compensation and should do so by reinforcing the purpose of expropriation for land reform 
purposes.  
 
Section 25(8) thus makes it possible for the state to depart from the requirements for 
compensation as set out in section 25(2)-(3) for land reform purposes. Considering no law of 
general application exists which allows the state to expropriate land without compensation for 
the purposes of land reform, I contend that the use of reasonable other measures to achieve land 
reform, as required by section 25(8) includes the courts’ ability to make use of their 




161 Budlender et al Juta’s New Land Law (1998) at 1-73. 
162 Bishop and Ngcukaitobi op cit note 24 at 12. 
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equitable’ compensation to include compensation amounts against nil or nominal amounts 
which can result in expropriation without compensation. This will speed up the land reform 
process which has been delayed for 25 years, owing to the state’s failure to implement effective 
land reform related legislative measures. 
 
5.3 Expropriation against nil compensation versus expropriation against nominal 
compensation? 
At present, there are two potential approaches that can be employed when interpreting 
section 25 of the Constitution to allow for expropriation for land reform purposes; the 
expropriation of land against nil compensation or the expropriation of land against nominal 
compensation. It is difficult to predict how the CCSA will react towards the proposed 
approaches. There are three important aspects that will determine whether any of the proposed 
approaches will survive constitutional attack.163 First, the Court will consider the evidence that 
the state produces i.e. that adherence to the current section 25(3) precedent will impede land 
reform. Second, whether the legal system seeks to balance the loss with the compensation 
amount based on justiciable factors. Third, whether the proposed approach holds an element of 
flexibility that allows for deviation in certain instances. 
 
5.3.1 Analysing the two different approaches to expropriation  
Expropriation against nil compensation 
The first approach entails the expropriation of property without awarding compensation. 
There are three pathways in which this can be realised under section 25.164 First, legislation can 
be developed such that the loss of property amounts to a deprivation in terms of section 25(1) 
instead of an expropriation. This can be achieved by transferring the land directly from the 
current landowners to the new landowners. Second, the state could hold that expropriation 
without compensation is just and equitable in certain circumstances in terms of section 25(3). 
Third, the state could argue that expropriation without compensation justifies the limitation in 
terms of section 25(8).165 
 
163 Ibid at 17. 




Regardless of which pathway is used to justify expropriation without compensation, the 
fundamental questions to be answered remain the same: 166 
 
(a)Are the categories narrowly defined to cover situations where the ordinary justifications for 
compensation do not apply?  
(b)Is expropriation without compensation reasonably necessary to further land reform?  
(c)Is provision made for exceptions where expropriation without compensation would cause 
especially harsh results? 
 
There are four potential circumstances wherein property could be expropriated without 
compensation for the purposes of land reform – (a) the land is abandoned or unused; (b) the 
land is held purely for speculative purposes; (c) the land is under-utilised and owned by public 
entities; or (d) the land is actively farmed by labour tenants in the absence of a title deed 
holder.167 These categories of land are capable of being expropriated as ‘the landowner will 
suffer, at worst, pure economic loss,’ considering the land is not being used productively.168 
Considering one of the reasons for land reform is to ensure not only racial redress in property 
ownership but also equitable access to land, the fact that there are large portions of land that 
remain unused despite the large number of underprivileged people who are landless and 
homeless does not promote equitable access to land. It is thus imperative for the courts to adopt 
an increased purposive approach to interpreting section 25 as such an interpretation is likely to 
justify expropriation against nil compensation as ‘just and equitable compensation’ under 
section 25(3) so as to further the land reform aims under section 25(8). 
 
Expropriation against nominal compensation 
Considering it is difficult to predict whether the courts will decide in favour of 
expropriation against nil compensation, it is plausible to assume that expropriation against nil 
compensation could potentially only occur in limited circumstances. Hence, allowing 







addition to allowing expropriation without compensation in certain circumstances, could speed 
up the land reform process.  
 
While both methods hold advantages and disadvantages, it is important that the state use 
the method which balances competing interests most effectively. The chosen method must 
ensure consistency between expropriation cases, subject to a degree of flexibility, should cases 
with special circumstances need to be taken into account. Considering some cases could require 
the use of market value as a determining factor, one of the methods that Bishop and Ngcukaitobi 
argue for is the payment of a flat rate per hectare so as to ensure consistency (subject to 
flexibility) between cases and to give effect to the principle of certainty as envisioned in section 
1(c) of the Constitution.169 However, I propose the development of a new and more flexible 
compensation regime which will include expropriation without compensation but will not be 
limited to this form of expropriation. 
 
While an amendment of section 25 to allow for expropriation without compensation will 
be beneficial, it is not required in order to give effect to land reform. I contend that the debates 
surrounding compensation amount to a policy issue as opposed to a constitutional issue, 
considering the constitution in its current structure can be interpreted to allow for expropriation 
without compensation. This policy issue is rooted in capitalism and the notion that the willing 
buyer/willing seller method of trade, or at the very least, being compensated upon being 
deprived of your property, is the key to individual economic freedom. While an amendment of 
section 25 may not be required, giving effect to this section’s vision of land reform does require 
new legislation, a new policy process, and a progressive judiciary that is willing to interpret this 
section and related property laws more purposively and in favour of land reform. 
 
5.4 A new and more flexible compensation regime – what should this include? 
A flexible compensation regime will be founded in the section 25(3) requirement of 
‘just and equitable’ compensation, which acknowledges that such compensation may amount 
to no or a nominal compensation amount in certain cases. Furthermore, such a compensation 
regime requires a revised compensation policy framework that makes provision for all possible 
 
169 Ibid at 21-22. 
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cases of expropriation. The compensation policy framework proposed by the Institute for 
Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) aptly captures a flexible compensation regime 
that is needed to fulfil the Constitution’s land reform aims.170 These include four categories of 
compensation:  
 
1. Nil compensation 
The requirement of zero compensation in some cases is due to a holder of a title deed 
having no effective occupation and use of land; thus failing to perform the function of property 
owner and failing to uphold the social function and utility of land. In the interests of property 
transformation, poor long-term tenants should be recognised as the de facto owners of property 
that they occupy. PLAAS identifies four cases where property should be expropriated without 
compensation:171 
 
(i) Inner-city buildings with absent landlords – There is an urgent need to address the 
issue of people who occupy abandoned inner-city buildings that are not maintained by the title 
holder. In such cases, the occupiers should be acknowledged as de facto property owners, hence 
expropriation without compensation should take place. This will give direct effect to land 
reform as envisioned by the Constitution by providing poor individuals with secure land rights. 
 
(ii) Informal settlements – A large portion of South Africa’s poverty-stricken 
individuals occupy informal settlements which consist of informal structures built on open land. 
Considering these individuals usually occupy informal settlements on a long-term basis, their 
property rights should be acknowledged. Hence, once their long-term occupation has been 
established, the state should expropriate this land to secure the rights of people who live in 
informal settlements.  
 
(iii) Labour tenants – Labour tenants refer to farm dwellers who have occupied land and 
grazed cattle on commercial farms on a long-term basis. These black labour tenants evaded 
eviction during the enactment of the Natives Land Act and thus have a historical right to 
 
170 PLAAS Submission to the Constitutional Review Committee (2018) 1 at 15. 
171 Ibid at 15-17. 
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continue occupying this land. The state should expropriate farms that are occupied by labour 
tenants in accordance with the Land Reform Act to secure these land rights. 
 
(iv) Public-owned land – The state should instruct public entities who are custodians of 
centrally located but under-used land to dispose of such land to encourage urban transformation 
by relocating poor people from the outskirts of cities to more central locations. 
 
(v) Land donation – The state should promote a land donations programme which will 
allow landowners the option of offering portions of land which will ultimately be expropriated 
without compensation. In doing so, donors such as churches ‘will have played the vital role of 
good corporate citizens by contributing meaningfully to land reform; one of the most patriotic 
and nation-building imperatives of the new democratic dispensation’.172 There would be an 
‘exemption from donations tax of any land donated to land reform’ in terms of this programme 
and once beneficiaries are identified, ‘the state should carry the conveyancing costs of the land 
transfers’.173 
 
2. Partial/nominal compensation 
The state should award partial/nominal compensation in cases where properties were 
acquired prior to 1994 and benefitted from subsidies under the apartheid-era or where properties 
were acquired post-1994 but are under-used or held for speculative purposes. A compensation 
policy should be created to determine how different cases should be treated. Such a policy 
would undoubtedly be contested in courts and would in turn provide clarity on the accuracy of 
the policy, which could be beneficial for the land reform process provided that the courts adopt 
an increased purposive interpretation of what is considered ‘just and equitable’ compensation 
in expropriation cases. The aim with such an approach should be to create certainty such that 
when the state offers partial compensation in future, property owners will accept this as law 
without attempting to litigate to contest the matter. Consequently, this will speed up the land 
 
172 E Mabuza ‘“Donations” of land and tax penalties for large landowners mooted’ Timeslive 28 July 2019, 
available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-07-28-donations-of-land-and-tax-penalties-for-




reform process, considering the state would not have to defend its award of partial/nominal 
compensation. 
 
3. Market-related compensation 
The state should compensate properties at market value in cases where these properties 
were acquired post-1994 and did not benefit from below-market value or from subsidies under 
the apartheid-era. This should apply to properties with landowners from all races, classes and 
nationalities. This will be in accordance with the section 25(1) requirement that a person may 
not be deprived of property in terms of law of general application. 
 
4. A premium above market compensation 
Land dispossession has extended from the colonial and apartheid eras into the 
democratic era, considering the large portion of poor, black South Africans who occupy 
informal settlements owing to having lost their property rights. In addition, individuals from 
communal areas have been evicted to make way for commercial operations that seemingly aim 
to benefit the economy. The compensation policy must therefore account for poor people who 
have lost property rights. This can be done by extending affirmative action to land reform in 
order to ensure that the poor, black majority of our population are able to benefit from prior 
land dispossessions. Considering merely awarding compensation at market value to these 
individuals would not benefit them financially, it should thus be proposed that the state award 
150% of the market price to individuals evicted from informal settlements, labour tenants and 
communal areas. This will give effect to the need to redress racial discrimination through land 










Chapter 6 – Conclusion  
This dissertation has set out to evaluate the courts’ approach to the interpretation of ‘just 
and equitable compensation’ as per section 25(3). I considered the research question of whether 
the courts have utilised an orthodox text-based (literal) approach or purposive approach to legal 
interpretation in their legal reasoning when deciding expropriation cases concerning the 
awarding of just and equitable compensation. Consequently, I assessed whether a literal 
approach or purposive approach to legal interpretation should be utilised to allow for the 
expropriation of land without compensation under section 25(3) of the Constitution (in its 
current composition), on the basis that land restitution and redistribution is necessary to speed 
up the land reform process. I contended that in order to give effect to the transformative values 
that underpin the Constitution, the courts should place more weight on a purposive approach 
when interpreting section 25 as a whole [and in the context of this dissertation, section 25(3) in 
particular]. Should the courts utilise this approach when interpreting section 25, the 
Constitution would not need to be amended to allow for expropriation without compensation in 
order to facilitate and speed up the land reform process as envisioned in section 25(8). Finally, 
I have considered whether expropriation without compensation constitutes just and equitable 
compensation. After establishing that sections 25(2)-(3) read with section 25(8) provide the 
requisite justification to expropriate property to facilitate and speed up the land reform process, 
and that expropriation without compensation may constitute just and equitable compensation 
in some cases, I have argued in favour of the adoption of a flexible approach to awarding just 
and equitable compensation. In utilising an increased purposive approach to interpretation, this 
flexible approach will ensure that both private and public interests are upheld through the state’s 
ability to award compensation at or above market value in cases where it is deemed fit; to award 
nil compensation in cases where it is deemed fit; and to award nominal compensation in cases 
where partial compensation is required, but where it is deemed fit for the state to award a 
compensation amount that is significantly below market value (owing to budgetary constraints). 
 
After considering the current composition of section 25(3), I have argued that the courts 
should place more weight on a purposive approach when interpreting this section (and section 
25 as a whole). Utilising a purposive approach means that the courts will increase the weight 
placed on its analysis of South Africa’s history of land dispossession. This will produce more 
positive outcomes in expropriation cases, as making arguments which consider the purpose of 
property laws (i.e. to facilitate land reform in order to correct the wrongs of the past), will give 
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direct effect to the transformative values that underpin section 25(3). I have argued that the 
construction of section 25 is transformative. However, the courts’ interpretation of the section 
has contributed towards the state continuously basing their approach to expropriation on the 
willing seller/willing buyer principle, which has in turn restricted the pace of the land reform 
process. 
 
In this dissertation, I have considered South Africa’s transformative constitutional 
mandate in relation to land reform and have illustrated that this mandate is informed by the 
Constitution’s commitment to transforming our society into one that affords all citizens 
equitable access to socio-economic resources which in turn informs their right to dignity. This 
includes the Constitution’s transformative aim to eradicate the socio-economic effects of the 
land dispossession which took place under colonialism and apartheid through not only enacting 
legislation and programmes which facilitate land restitution and redistribution, but also through 
a progressive interpretation of all property laws, including traditional rules and section 25 of 
the Constitution. The requirement for a transformative interpretation can best be given effect to 
through using a purposive approach to interpretation which strongly considers the effects of our 
history of land dispossession when interpreting the law. This consideration of our history will 
lead legal actors to apply property laws such that they decrease or completely eradicate the 
deplorable effects that land dispossession has had on the lives of previously disadvantaged 
South Africans; thus giving effect to the transformative aims of the Constitution.  
 
My analysis on legal culture has shown that it has had an impact on the interpretation 
of law and on the application of section 25 in relation to improving and speeding up the land 
reform process. This impact includes the courts’ inclination to utilising a formalistic approach 
to interpreting section 25, despite the underlying egalitarian nature of the section and the general 
transformative nature of the Constitution. Such formalism has resulted in the courts overlooking 
the potential that section 25(8) possesses to speed up the land reform process. In considering 
the legal culture pertaining to the interpretation and application of section 25, I have referred to 
the academic dialogue surrounding section 25 and whether expropriation for land reform 
purposes (which may include expropriation against nil or nominal compensation) complies with 
the constitutional duty to promote land reform and ultimately, whether such expropriation is 
constitutionally permissible. I have illustrated that the analyses of the transformative potential 
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of section 25 that was explored by the various academics has shown that section 25 should be 
read as a whole. Hence, the state’s right to expropriate under sections 25(2)-(3) may be 
reconciled with the section 25(8) duty to facilitate land reform, even where such land reform 
requires that ‘other measures’, such as expropriating land against nil or nominal compensation, 
be taken. 
 
In order to facilitate expropriation for land reform purposes as envisioned in the 
aforementioned paragraph, I considered the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of section 25 
by looking at the First National Bank decision. The enactment of the Constitution required a 
newfound need for the courts to interpret its provisions (i.e. section 25 in this instance) such 
that it promotes the transformative values of a democratic and open society that recognises the 
injustices of its past and aims to improve the quality of life of all citizens by ensuring that all 
citizens are equally protected by law.174 In order to promote these transformative values, it is 
thus required that courts utilise a purposive interpretation. By looking at the Constitutional 
Court’s use of a purposive interpretation, I contended that section 25 does provide the 
justification for the state’s expropriation of land against nil or nominal compensation to 
facilitate land reform at a faster pace. However, owing to the formalistic approach that the 
courts have utilised when interpreting the section 25(3) factors set out to determine just and 
equitable compensation amounts to be awarded upon expropriation, the courts have inaptly 
placed too much weight on their consideration of market value when determining compensation 
amounts. This has consequently resulted in a delayed land reform process and has not given 
effect to the transformative aims of section 25 and the Constitution as a whole. Favouring a 
market value-centred approach to determining compensation amounts reinforce the socio-
economic disparities that were created under colonialism and apartheid; the effects of which 
are still felt today. 
 
  Given that the courts’ market value-centred approach to determining compensation 
amounts is inapt, this has led to the determination of compensation amounts that are mostly at 
or above market value and thus requires the state to spend even more of its already constrained 
budget. This increased pressure on the national budget can impede land reform, especially if 
the courts continue to employ a formalistic, market value-centred approach to interpreting just 
 
174 Preamble of the Constitution. 
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and equitable compensation. In order to give effect to section 25 and its aim to protect both 
private and public rights to property, I have argued in favour of adopting a flexible approach to 
awarding just and equitable compensation. This flexible approach will allow for expropriation 
against nil compensation, expropriation against partial compensation, expropriation at market 
value and expropriation at above market value; the appropriate compensation of which will be 
determined by the courts. Considering the courts provide the appropriate platform to 
determining compensation amounts at present, this approach can be fulfilled through the 
adoption of an increased purposive interpretation of law which reinforces that judges are to 
recognise our history of land dispossession and the need to correct the wrongs of the past and 
promote land reform, one judgment at a time. In adopting this approach to interpretation, 
expropriation against nil or nominal compensation can be achieved. This ultimately eradicates 
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